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Abstract. The existing peer-to-peer networks have several problems such as 
fake content distribution, free riding, white-washing and poor search scalability, 
lack of a robust trust model and absence of user privacy protection mechanism. 
Although, several trust management and semantic community-based mechan-
isms for combating free riding and distribution of malicious contents have been 
proposed by some researchers, most of these schemes lack scalability due to 
their high computational, communication and storage overhead. This paper 
presents a robust trust management scheme for P2P networks that utilizes to-
pology adaptation by constructing an overlay of trusted peers where the neigh-
bors are selected based on their trust ratings and content similarities. While in-
creasing the search efficiency by intelligently exploiting the formation of se-
mantic community structures by topology adaptation among the trustworthy 
peers, the scheme provides the users a very high level of privacy protection of 
their usage and consumption patterns of network resources. Simulation results 
demonstrate that the proposed scheme provides efficient searching to good 
peers while penalizing the malicious peers by increasing their search times as 
the network topology stabilizes.   
Keywords: P2P network, topology adaptation, trust, reputation, semantic 
community, malicious peer, user privacy. 
1   Introduction 
The term peer-to-peer (P2P) system encompasses a broad set of distributed applica-
tions which allow sharing of computer resources by direct exchange between systems. 
The goal of a P2P system is to aggregate resources available at the edge of Internet 
and to share it cooperatively among users. Specially, the file sharing P2P systems have 
become popular as a new paradigm for information exchange among large number of 
users in Internet. They are more robust, scalable, fault tolerant and offer better availa-
bility of resources. Depending on the presence of central server, P2P system can be 
classified as centralized or decentralized [1]. In decentralized architecture, both re-
source discovery and download are distributed. Decentralized P2P application may be 
further classified as structured or unstructured network. In structured network, there is 
a restriction on the placement of content and network topology. In unstructured P2P 
network, however, placement of content is unrelated to topology. Unstructured P2P 
networks perform better than their structured counterpart in dynamic environment. 
However, they need efficient search mechanisms and suffer from fake content distri-
bution, free riding (peers who do not share, but consume resources), whitewashing 
(peers who leave and rejoin the system in order to avoid penalties) and search scala-
bility problems. Open and anonymous nature of P2P applications lead to complete 
lack of accountability of the content a peer puts in the network. The malicious peers 
often use these networks to do content poisoning and to distribute harmful programs 
such as Trojan Horses and viruses [2]. Distributed reputation based trust management 
systems have been proposed to provide protection against malicious content distribu-
tion [3]. The main drawbacks of these schemes are their high message exchange over-
heads and their susceptibility to misrepresentation. Guo et al. have proposed trust-
aware adaptive P2P topology to control free-riders and malicious peers [4]. In [5], and 
[6] topology adaptation is used to reduce inauthentic file download. However, these 
schemes do not work well in unstructured networks. Poor search scalability is another 
problem. Traditional mechanisms such as controlled flooding, random walker and 
topology evolution all lack scalability. Zhuge et al. have proposed trust-based proba-
bilistic search algorithm called P-walk to improve search efficiency and to reduce 
unnecessary traffic in P2P networks [7]. In P-walk, neighboring peers assign trust 
scores to each other. During routing, peers preferentially forward queries to the highly 
ranked neighbors. However, its performance in large-scale unstructured network is 
questionable. To combat free riders, various trust-based incentive mechanisms are 
presented in [8]. Most of these mechanisms, however, involve large overhead of com-
putations.   
 To combat the problem of inauthentic downloads as well as to improve search sca-
lability while protecting the privacy of the users, this paper proposes an adaptive trust-
aware algorithm that is robust and scalable. This work is an extension of our already 
published scheme which is based on construction an overlay of trusted peers where 
neighbors are selected based on their trust ratings and content similarities [9]. It in-
creases search efficiency by taking advantage of implicit semantic community struc-
tures formed as a result of topology adaptation since most of the queries are resolved 
within the community [9].   However, the novel contribution of the current work is 
that it combines the functionalities of a robust trust management model and the seman-
tic community formation that also ensures user privacy is protected. While the trust 
management scheme segregates honest peers from malicious peers, based on both 
first-hand and second-hand information, the semantic community formation allows 
topology adaptation to form cluster of peers which share similar contents. The forma-
tion of the semantic communities also enables the scheme to form a neighborhood of 
trust which is utilized to protect user privacy in the network.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some related 
work. Section 3 presents the proposed algorithm for secure and privacy-aware search-
ing. For the benefit of the readers, we present the entire algorithm including the one 
presented in [9]. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the scheme presented in this 
paper has a robust trust management model and privacy preserving module which 
were not present in the scheme described in [9]. Section 4 introduces various metrics 
to measure performance of the proposed algorithm, and presents the simulation re-
sults. Section 5 concludes the paper while highlighting some future scope of work.  
2   Related Work 
In [10], a searching mechanism is proposed that is based on discovery of trust paths 
among the peers in a peer-to-peer network. A global trust model based on distance-
weighted recommendations has been proposed in [11] to quantify and evaluate the 
peers in a peer-to-peer network. In [5], a protocol named adaptive peer-to-peer tech-
nologies (APT) for the formation of adaptive topologies has been proposed to reduce 
spurious file download and free riding, where a peer connects to those peers from 
whom it is most likely to download satisfactory content. It adds or removes neighbors 
based on local trust and connection trust which are decided by its transaction history. 
The scheme follows a defensive strategy for punishment where a peer equally punish-
es both malicious peers as well as neighbors through which it receives response from 
malicious peers. This strategy is relaxed in the reciprocal capacity-based adaptive 
topology protocol (RC-ATP), where a peer connects to others which have higher 
reciprocal capacity [6]. Reciprocal capacity is defined based on peers’s capacity of 
providing good files and of recommending source of download. While RC-ATP pro-
vides better network connectivity than APT, and reduces the cost of inauthentic down-
loads, it has a large overhead of topology adaptation.    
There are some significant difference between the proposed algorithm and APT 
and RC-ATP. First, in the proposed scheme, the links in the original overlays are 
never deleted to avoid network partitioning.  Second, the robustness of the proposed 
protocol in presence of malicious peers is higher than that of APT and RC-ATP proto-
cols as shown in the experimental results. Third, as APT and RC-ATP both use flood-
ing to locate resource, they have poor search scalability. The proposed scheme takes 
the advantages of semantic communities to improve QoS of search. Fourth, APT and 
RC-ATP do not employ any robust trust model for security in searching and for user 
identity and data privacy protection. The central part of the proposed searching me-
chanism in this paper is a robust trust management model. Finally, unlike APT and 
RC-ATP, the proposed algorithm scheme punishes malicious peers by blocking query 
initiated by them.      
3   The Proposed Secure and Privacy-Aware Searching Algorithm  
This section is divided into two parts. In the first part, the various parameters for P2P 
networks are discussed. In the second part, the proposed algorithm is presented.  
3.1  The Network Environment 
To derive meaningful conclusion from the proposed algorithm, the proposed scheme 
have been modeled in P2P networks in a realistic fashion. The factors that are taken 
into consideration are as follows. 
(1)Network topology and load: The topology of the network plays an important 
role for the analysis of trust management and search procedure. Following the work in 
[5][6], the network has been modeled as a power law graph. In a power law network, 
degree distribution of nodes follows power law distribution, i.e. fraction of nodes 
having degree L is L-k where k is a network dependent constant. Prior to each simula-
tion cycle a fixed fraction of peers chosen randomly is marked as malicious. As the 
algorithm proceeds, the peers adjust topology locally to connect those peers which 
have better chance to provide good files in future and drop malicious peers from their 
neighborhood. The network links are categorized into two types: connectivity link and 
community link. The connectivity links are the edges of the original power law net-
work which provide seamless connectivity among the peers. To prevent the network 
from being fragmented they are never deleted. On the other hand, community links are 
added probabilistically between the peers who know each other. A community link 
may be deleted when perceived trustworthiness of a peer falls in the perception of its 
neighbors. A limit is put on the additional number of edges that a node can acquire to 
control bandwidth usage and query processing overhead in the network. This increase 
in network load is measured relative to the initial network degree (corresponding to 
connectivity edges). Let final_degree(x) and initial_degree(x) be the initial and final 
degree of a node x. The relative increase in connectivity (RIC) is constrained by a 
parameter known as edge_limit.  
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(2) Content distribution: The dynamics of a P2P network are highly dependent on 
the volume and variety of files each peer chooses to share. Hence a model reflecting 
real-world P2P networks is required. It has been observed that peers are in general 
interested in a subset of the content on the P2P network [12]. Also, the peers are often 
interested only in files from a few content categories. Among these categories some 
are more popular than others. It has been shown that Gnutella content distribution 
follows zipf distribution [13]. Keeping this in mind, both content categories and file 
popularity within each category is modeled with zipf distribution with α = 0.8. 
Content distribution model: The content distribution model in [13] is followed for 
simulation purpose. In this model, each distinct file fc ,r is abstractly represented by the 
tuple (c, r), where c represents the content category to which the file belongs, and r 
represents its popularity rank within a content category c. Let content categories be C 
= {c1, c2,…,c32}. Each content category is characterized by its popularity rank. For 
example, if c1 = 1, c2 = 2 and c3 = 3, then c1 is more popular than c2 and hence it is 
more replicated than c2 and so on. Also there are more files in category c1 than c2.  
Table 1. Hypothetical content distribution in peer nodes 
Peers Content categories 
P1 {C1, C2, C3} 
P2 {C2, C4, C6, C7} 
P3 {C2, C4, C7, C8} 
P4 {C1, C2} 
P5 {C1, C5, C6} 
 
Each peer randomly chooses between three to six content categories to share files 
and shares more files in more popular categories. Table 1 shows an illustrative content 
distribution among 5 peers. The category c1 is more replicated as it is most popular. 
The Peer 1 shares files in three categories: c1, c2, c3 where it shares maximum number 
of files in category c1, followed by category c2 and so on. On the other hand, Peer 3 
shares maximum number of files in category c2 as it’s the most popular among the 
categories chosen by it, followed by c4 and so on.  
(3) Query initiation model: The authors in [13] suggest that peers usually query for 
files that exist on the network and are in the content category of their interest. In each 
cycle of simulation, active peers issue queries. However number of queries a peer 
issues may vary from peer to peer, modeled by Poisson distribution as follows. If M is 
the total number of queries to be issued in each cycle of simulation and N is the num-
ber of peers present in the network, query rate 
N
M=λ  is the mean of the Poisson 
process. The expression 
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K queries in a cycle. The probability that a peer issues query for the file fc,r depends on 
the peer’s interest level in category c and rank r of the file within that category.  
(4) Trust management engine: A trust management engine is designed which helps 
a peer to compute trust ratings of other peers from past transactions as well as recom-
mendation from its neighbor. For computation of trust values for the peers, a method 
similar to the one proposed in [14] is followed. The framework employs a beta distri-
bution for reputation representation, updates and integration. The first-hand informa-
tion and second-hand (recommendation from neighbors) are combined to compute the 
reputation value of a peer. The weight assigned by a peer i to a second-hand informa-
tion received from a node k is a function of reputation of node k as maintained in node 
i. For each peer j, a reputation Rij is computed by a neighbor peer i. The reputation is 
embodied in the Beta model which has two parameters αij and βij. αij represents the 
number of successful transactions (i.e. authentic file downloads) that peer i had with 
peer j, and βij represents the number of unsuccessful transactions (i.e., unauthentic file 
downloads). The reputation of peer j maintained by peer i is computed using (2): 
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The trust metric of a peer is the expected value of its reputation and is given by (3):  
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The second-hand information is presented to peer i by its neighbor peer k. The peer 
i receives the reputation Rkj of peer j from peer k, in the form of the two parameters αkj 
and βkj. After receiving this new information the peer combines it with its current 
assessment Rij to obtain a new reputation 
new
ijR  as shown in (4): 
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In (4) the values of newijα  and newijβ  are given by (5) and (6) as follows: 
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The proposed trust model gives more weight to recent observations, which is used 
for updating the reputation value suing direct observation. For updating the reputation 
value using the second-hand information, Dempster-Shafer theory [15] and the belief 
discouting model [16] are used.  The reputation of a recommending peer is automati-
cally taken into account while computing the reputation of the reported peer. This 
eliminates the need of a separate deviation test. As mentioned earlier in this section, 
the trust value of a peer is computed as the statistical expected value of its reputation. 
The trust value of a peer lies in the interval [0, 1]. Peer i considers peer j as trustwor-
thy if 5.0≥ijS , and malicious if 5.0<ijS .   
(5) Identity of the peers: Each peer generates a 1024 bit public/private RSA key 
pair. The public key serves as the identity of the peer. The identities are persistent and 
they enable two peers that have exchanged keys to locate and connect to one another 
whenever the peers are online. In addition, a distributed hash table (DHT) is main-
tained that lists the transient IP-addresses and port numbers for all peers for all appli-
cations running of the peers. DHT entries for the peer i are signed by i and encrypted 
with its public key. Each entry is indexed by a 20 byte randomly generated shared 
secret, which is agreed upon during the first successful connection between two peers. 
Each peer’s location in the DHT is independent of its identity and is determined by 
hashing the client’s current IP address and DHT port. This inhibits systematic moni-
toring of targeted regions of the DHT key space since the region foe which each peer 
is responsible is determined by that peer’s network address and port. 
(6) Node churning model: In P2P networks, a large number of peers may join and 
leave at any time. This activity is termed as node churning. To simulate node churn-
ing, prior to each generation (a set of consecutive searches), a fixed percentage of 
nodes are chosen randomly as inactive. These peers neither initiate nor respond to a 
query in that generation and join the system latter with their LRU structure cleared. 
Since in a real world network, even in presence of churning, the approximate distribu-
tion of content categories and files remain constant, content of nodes undergoing 
churn is exchanged which in effect assigns each of them new content as well as keeps 
content distribution model of the network unchanged.  
(7) Threat model: Malicious peers adopt various strategies (threat model) to con-
ceal their behavior and disrupt system activity. Two threat models are considered in 
the proposed scheme. The peers who share good quality files enjoy better topological 
due to topology adaptation. In threat model A, malicious peers attempt to circumvent 
this by providing good file occasionally with probability, known as degree of decep-
tion to lure other peers to form communities with them. In threat model B, a group of 
malicious peer joins to the system and provides good files until their connectivity 
reaches to edge limit, and then start spreading fake content in the network.  
3.2   The proposed search algorithm  
The network learns trust information through the search and updates trust information 
and adapts topology based on the outcome of the search. The following criteria are 
kept in mind while designing the algorithm: (1) It should improve search efficiency as 
well as search quality (authentic file download). (2) It should have minimal overhead 
in terms of computation, storage and message passing. (3) It should provide incentive 
to share large number of high quality files. (4) It should be self policing in the sense 
that a peer can adjust search strategy based on local estimate of network connectivity. 
(5) It should be able to protect the privacy of the users. Major steps of the algorithm 
are: (i) search, (ii) trust computing and verification, and (iii) topology adaptation. 
Each of these steps is discussed in the following. 
3.2.1   Search 
A time to live (TTL) bound search is used. At each hop, query is forwarded to a subset 
of neighbors, the number of neighbors is decided based on the local estimate connec-
tivity. This connectivity index for peer x is denoted as Probcom (x) and is given by (7):  
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When Probcom for a node is low, the peer has the capacity to accept new community 
edges and expand community structures. Higher the value of Probcom, lesser the 
neighbors choose to disseminate queries. As simulation proceeds, connectivity of 
good nodes increases and reaches a maximum value. At this time, the peers focus on 
directing queries to appropriate community which may host the specific file rather 
than expanding communities. For example, if peer i can contact at most 10 neighbors 
and Probcom of j is 0.6, it forwards query to: 10 x (1 – 0.6) = 4 neighbors only. The 
search strategy modified from initial TTL limited BFS to directed DFS with the re-
structuring of the network. The search process has two steps– query initiation and 
query forward. These steps are described in the following. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Neighbor selection at P for query string (c2, f4). Community edges and connectivity 
edges are drawn with solid and dotted lines respectively. Nodes that dispatch query are shaded. 
 
Query initiation: The initiating peer forms a query packet containing the name of 
the file (c, r) and forwards it to a certain fraction of neighbors along with Probcom and 
TTL value. The query is disseminated using the following neighbor selection rule. 
The neighbors are ranked based on both trustworthiness and the similarity of interest. 
Preference is given to the trusted neighbors sharing similar contents. Among the 
trusted neighbors, community members having content matched to the query are pre-
ferred. When there are insufficient community links, query is forwarded through con-
nectivity links also. The various cases of neighbor selection are illustrated in Fig. 1. It 
is assumed that in each case only two neighbors are selected. When the query (c2, f4) 
reaches node P, following cases may occur. In first case, P has adequate community 
neighbors sharing file in category c2, hence they are chosen. In Case 2, there is insuf-
ficient number of community neighbors sharing file in the requested category, the 
community neighbors sharing c2 and c6 preferred to the connectivity neighbor c2 to 
forward query. In Case 3, only one community neighbor who share file is c2. Hence it 
is chosen. From the remaining connectivity neighbors, most trusted c6 is selected. In 
Case 4, only connectivity neighbor are there, assuming all of them at the same trust 
level, the matching neighbor c2 is chosen and from the rest c5 is selected randomly. 
The pseudo-code for the query initiation algorithm is presented in Algorithm 1. 
 
 
 
When a query reaches to peer i from peer j, following actions are performed by the 
peer i. 
Query forward: (i) Check trust level of peer j: Peer i checks trust rating of peer j 
through check trust rating algorithm (explained later). Accordingly decision regarding 
further propagation of the query is taken. (ii) Check the availability of file: If the re-
quested file is found, response is sent to peer j. If TTL value has not expired, the fol-
lowing steps are executed. (iii) Calculate the number of messages to be sent: It is 
calculated based on the value of Probcom.(iv) Choose neighbors: Neighbors are chosen 
in using neighbor selection rule. The search process is shown in Fig. 2. It is assumed 
that the query is forwarded at each hop to two neighbors. The matching community 
links are preferred over connectivity links to dispatch query. Peer 1 initiates query and 
forwards it to two community neighbors 3 and 4. The query reaches peer 8 via peer 4. 
However, peer 8 knows that peer 4 is malicious from previous transactions. Hence it 
blocks the query. The query forwarded by peer 5 is also blocked by peer 10 and 11 as 
both of them know that peer 5 is malicious. The query is matched at four peers: 4, 6, 9 
and 13. The pseudo-code for the query forward algorithm is presented in Algorithm 2. 
The search process is shown in Fig. 2. 
Topology Adaptation: Responses are sorted by the initiating peer i based on the 
reputation of resource providers and peer having highest reputation is selected as 
source of download. The requesting peer checks the authenticity of downloaded file. If 
the file is found to be fake, peer i attempts to download from other sources until it 
finds the authentic resource or no more sources exist and updates the trust rating and 
possibly adapts topology after failed or successful download, to bring trusted peers to 
its neighborhood and to drop malicious peers from its community. The restructuring of 
network is controlled by a parameter known as degree of rewiring which is the proba-
bility with which a link is formed between two peers. This parameter allows trust 
information slowly to be propagated as happens in real network. Topology adaptation 
consists of the following operations: (i) link deletion: Peer i deletes the existing com-
munity link with peer j if it finds peer j as malicious. (ii) link addition: Peer i probabil-
istically forms community link with peer j if resource is found to be authentic. If 
edge_limitRIC ≤ , for both peers i and j, only then an edge can be added subject to 
the approval of resource provider j. If peer j finds that peer i is malicious, it doesn’t 
approve the link. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. The breadth first search (BFS) tree for the search procedure initiated by peer 1. 
In the example shown in Fig. 3, peer 1 downloads the file from peer 4 and finds 
that the file is spurious. It reduces the trust score of peer 4 and deletes the community 
link 1-4. It then downloads the file from peer 6 and gets an authentic file. Peer 1 now 
sends a request to peer 6, and the latter grants the request after consulting its LRU and 
the community edge 1-6 is added. The malicious peer 4 loses one community link and 
peer 6 gains one community edge. However, the network still remains connected by 
connectivity edges, shown in dotted lines. Algorithm 3 presents the pseudo-code for 
the topology adaptation process.  
Check trust rating: Trust rating is used at various stage of the algorithm to make 
decision about the possible source for download, to stop a query forwarded from a 
malicious node and to adapt topology. A least recently used (LRU) data structure is 
used at each peer to keep track of 32 most recent peers it has interacted with. When no 
transaction history is available, a peer seeks recommendation from its neighbors using 
trust query. When peer i doesn’t have trust score of peer j in its LRU history, it first 
seeks recommendation about j from all of its community neighbors. If none of its 
community neighbors possesses any information about j, peer i initiates directed DFS 
search. The trust computation model has been presented in Section 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2.2   Privacy-preservation in searching  
The trust-based searching scheme described above does not guarantee any privacy 
requirement of the requester (i.e. the initiator of the query). For protecting the privacy 
of the user, several enhancement of the algorithm are proposed. Following cases are 
identified for privacy preservation. 
(a) Identity of the requesting peer is to be protected: In this case, as shown in Fig 4. 
instead of sending the request straightway to the supplier peer, the requesting peer 
asks one of its trusted peers (which may or may not be its neighbor) to look up the 
data on its behalf. Once the query propagation module successfully identifies the poss-
ible supplier of the resource, the trusted peer serves as a proxy to deliver the data to 
the requester node. Other peers including the supplier of the resource will not be able 
to know the real requester. Hence, the requester’s privacy is protected. Since the re-
questor’s identity is only known to its trusted peer, the strength of privacy is depen-
dent on the effort required to compromise the trusted peer. As mentioned in Section 
3.1, the message communicated the peers are encrypted by 1024 bit RSA key, which 
is a provably secure algorithm. Hence, the privacy of the requester is highly protected. 
(b) Protecting the data handle: To improve the achieved privacy level, the data 
handle may not be put in the request at the beginning. When a requester initiates the 
request, it computes the hash value of the handle and reveals only a part of the hash 
result in the request sent to its trusted peer. The steps 1 and 2 in Fig 5 represent these 
activities. Each peer receiving the request compares the revealed partial hash to hash 
codes of the data handles that it holds. Depending on the length of the revealed part, 
the receiving peer may find multiple matches. This does not, however, imply that the 
peer has the requested data. Thus this peer will provide a candidate set, along with a 
certificate of its public key, to the requester. If the matched set is not empty, the peer 
will construct a Bloom filter [17] based on the left parts of the matched has codes, and 
send it back to the trusted peer. The trusted peer forwards it back to the requester. 
These are represented by the steps 3 and 4 in Fig. 5. Examining the filters, the re-
quester can eliminate from the candidate data supplier list all peers that do not have 
the required data. It then encrypts the complete request with the supplier’s public key 
and gets the requested data with the help from its trusted node. The steps 5, 6, 7 and 8 
in Fig 5 represent these activities. By adjusting the length of the revealed hash code, 
the requestor can control the number of eliminated peers. The level of privacy is much 
improved than the previous case since the malicious peers need to both compromise 
the trusted node and break the Bloom filter and has function. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Topology adaptation based on outcome of the search in Figure 2. Malicious nodes are 
shaded in gray color.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Identity protection of the requesting peer i from the supplier peer k by use of trusted 
peer j. REQ and RES are the request and response messages respectively. 
 
Fig. 5. Protecting data handle using trusted node. Peer i and k are the requester and the supplier 
peer. Peer j is the trusted peer of the requester peer i.  
 
(c) Hiding the data content: Although the privacy-preservation level has been im-
proved during the look-up phase using the previous two schemes, the privacy of the 
requester will be compromised if the trusted node can see the data content when it 
relays the packets for the requester. To improve privacy level and prevent eavesdrop-
ping, we can encrypt the data handle and the data content. If the identity of the suppli-
er is known to the requester, it can encrypt the request using the supplier’s public key. 
The public key of the requester cannot be used because the certificate will reveal its 
identity. The problem is solved in the following manner. The requester generates a 
symmetric key and encrypts it using a supplier’s public key. Only the supplier can 
recover the key and use it to encrypt data. To prevent the trusted node of the requester 
from conducting a man-in-the-middle attack, the trusted node is required to sign the 
packet. This provides a non-repudiation evidence, and shows that the packet is not 
generated by the trusted node itself. The privacy level has been improved since now 
the malicious nodes need to break the encryption keys as well.  
4   Performance Evaluation 
To analyze the performance of the proposed algorithm, several metrics are defined. 
Due to constraints of space, the performances of the algorithm for some of the metrics 
are presented in this paper. Additional experimental results may be found in [9]. 
(a) Attempt ratio (AR): A peer keeps on downloading files from various sources 
based on their trust rating till it gets the authentic file. AR is the probability that the 
authentic file is downloaded in the first attempt. A high value of AR is desirable. 
(b) Effective attempt ratio (EAR): It measures the cost of downloading an authentic 
file by a good peer in comparison to the cost incurred by a malicious peer.  
If P(i) be the total number of attempts made by the peer i to download an authentic 
file, EAR is given by (8): 
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In (8), M and N are the number of malicious and good peers issuing queries in a 
particular generation. For example, EAR = 50 implies that if a good peer needs one 
attempt to download an authentic file, a malicious peer will need two attempts.  
(c) Query miss ratio (QMR): Since the formation of semantic communities takes 
some time, there will be a high rate of query misses in the first few generations of 
search. However, as the algorithm execuates, the rate of query miss is expected to fall 
for the good peers. QMR is defined as the ratio of the number of search failures to the 
total number of searches in a generation.   
(d)  Relative increase in connectivity (RIC): After a successful download, a re-
questing peer attempts to establish a community edge with the resource provider, if 
approved by the latter. This ensures that peers which provide good community servic-
es are rewarded by having increasing number of community neighbors. The metric 
RIC measures the number of community neighbors a peer gains with respect to its 
connectivity neighbors in the initial network topology. If Dinit(i) and Dfinal(i) are the 
initial and final degrees of the peer i, and N is the number of peers, then RIC for peer i 
is computed using (9). As discussed in [9], the connectivity of good peers increases 
significantly over time. 
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(e) Closeness centrality (CC): Since the topology adaptation effectively brings the 
good peers closer to each other, the length of the shortest path between a pair of good 
decreases. This intrinsic incentive for sharing authentic files is measured by the metric 
CC. The peers with higher CC values are topologically better positioned. If Pij is the 
length of the shortest path between peer i and peer j through the community edges and 
if V denotes the set of peers, then CC for peer i is given by (10). 
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(f) Clustering coefficient (CLC): It gives an indication about how well the network 
forms cliques and plays an important role in choosing the TTL value. Higher the value 
of CLC, lower TTL value can be used. If Ki be the number of community neighbors of 
peer i, then clustering coefficient (CLS) of peer i is defined as:  
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In (11), Ei is the actual number of community edges between the Ki neighbors. CLC 
of the network is taken as the average value of all  CLC(i)s.  
(f) Trust query propagation overhead (TQPO): The peers build trust and reputation 
information both by collection of first-hand and second-hand information. Trust query 
message is propagated when trust information about a peer is not available locally. A 
trust query message involves one DFS round without backtracking. The overhead 
incurred due to trust query propagation is measured by the metric called trust query 
propagation overhead (TQPO). TQPO is defined as the total number of distinct DFS 
search attempts per generation. It may be noted that a trust query may be initiated 
multiple times for a single file search operation: to select a trusted neighbor or to 
approve a community link.  
(g) Largest connected component (LCC): The community edges connect nodes 
with similar content interest and having mutual trust on each other. If we consider the 
peers which share a particular category of contents, then the community edges form a 
trust-aware community overlay. However, it will be highly probable that the trust-
aware overly graph will be a disconnected graph. LCC is the largest connected com-
ponent of this disconnected overlay graph. LCC of the network can be taken as a 
measure of the goodness of the community structure since it signifies how strongly the 
peers with similar contents and interests are connected with each other. It is expressed 
in terms of the percentage of nodes of a particular category that lies within the LCC. 
A discrete time simulator written in C is used for simulation. In simulation, 6000 
peer nodes, 18000 connectivity edges, 32 content categories are chosen. The degree of 
deception and the degree of rewiring are taken as 0.1 and 0.3 respectively. The value 
of the edge_limit is taken as 0.3. The TTL values for BFS and DFS are taken as 5s 
and 10 s respectively. The discrete time simulator simulates the algorithm repeatedly 
on the power law network and outputs all the metrics averaged over generations. Ba-
rabasi-Albert generator is used to generate initial power law graphs with 6000 nodes 
and approximately 18000 edges. The number of search per generation is taken as 5000 
while the number of generations per cycle of simulation is 100. 
 
 
Fig. 6. AR vs. percentage of malicious nodes. In (a) 10% , in (b) 20% nodes are malicious 
To check the robustness of the algorithm against attack from malicious peers, the 
percentage of malicious peers is gradually increased. Fig. 6 illustrates the cost in-
curred by each type of peers to download authentic files. As the percentage of mali-
cious peers is increased, cost incurred by malicious peers to download authentic files 
decreases while that of good peers increases.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Largest connected components (LCC) for different content categories 
 
Fig. 7 depicts the size of LCC for each of the 32 content categories. It may be ob-
served that the average size of LCC for all content categories remains even if the per-
centage of malicious peers increases. This clearly shows that the community formation 
among the honest peers is not affected by the presence of malicious nodes.  
Fig. 8 presents how the closeness centrality (CC) of good and malicious peers va-
ries in the community topology. In computation of CC, only the community edges 
have been considered. It may be observed that the steady state value of CC for honest 
peers is around 0.12. However, for the malicious peers, the CC value is found to lie 
between 0.03 to 0.07. This demonstrates how effectively the malicious peers are dri-
ven to the fringe of the network while the good peers are rewarded.   
Higher values of CC also indicate that good peers have smaller average shortest 
path length between them. In the simulation, the diameter of the initial network is 
taken as 5. At the end of one simulation run, if there is no path between a pair of peers 
using community edges, then the length of the shortest path between that pair is as-
sumed to be arbitrarily long, say 15 (used in Fig. 9). As shown in Fig. 9, the average 
shortest path distance (ASPD) decreases form the initial value of 15 for both honest 
and malicious nodes. However, the rate and the extent of decrease for honest peers are 
much higher due to the formation of semantic communities. For malicious peers, after 
an initial fall, the value of ASPD increases consistently and finally almost reaches the 
maximum value of 15. On the other hand, the average value of ASPD for honest peers 
is observed to be around 6. Since the honest nodes are connected with shorter paths, 
the query propagations and their responses will also be faster among these nodes.  
 
Fig. 8. Closeness centrality for various percentages of malicious nodes. In (a) 20% and (b) 40% 
nodes are malicious. 
 
Fig. 9. Avg. shortest path distance vs generations of search at the step of ten for various percen-
tages of malicious peers. In (a) 30%  and in (b) 40% nodes are  malicious.  
Fig. 10 shows that as the topology of the network matures, the steady state value of 
trust query propagation overhead (TQPO) attains a quite low value – less than 10 
when 10% of the peers in the network are malicious. Even when the network has 40% 
of its peers malicious, TQPO gradually decreases and is less than 20 within 100 gen-
erations. Hence trust propagation has little impact on the system overhead since the 
trust information gets embedded in trust-aware overlay topology. Moreover, the sto-
rage requirement is low due to usage of the LRU structure. 
Fig. 11 shows clustering coefficient (CLC) for each type of peers. Since community 
edges are added based on the download history and peers having good reputation gain 
more community edges, clustering coefficient (CLC) is high for good peers. This leads 
to triangle formation in the communities. To counter this phenomenon, the search 
strategy adapts itself from BFS to DFS to minimize redundant message flows in the 
network. Since edges are added based on the download history and similarity of inter-
est, community of peers are formed which are connected to other community by hub 
peers having interest in multiple content categories. This leads to lower ASPD for 
good peers.  
 
Fig. 10. Overhead of trust query propagation for 10% and 20% malicious peers in the network  
 
Figure 11. Clustering coefficients for different percentages of malicious peers. In (a) 20% and 
in (b) 40% of the peers are malicious. 
5   Conclusion 
In this paper, a search mechanism is proposed that solves multiple problems in peer-
to-peer network e.g., inauthentic download, poor search scalability, combating free 
riders and protecting user privacy. It is shown that by topology adaptation, and robust 
trust management, it is possible to isolate the malicious peers while providing topolog-
ically advantageous positions to the good peers so that good peers get faster and au-
thentic responses to their queries. Simulation results have demonstrated that the proto-
col is robust in presence of a large percentage of malicious peers. Analysis of message 
overhead of the privacy module constitutes a future plan of work.   
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